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The WTO Transparency Obligations and China 
 
Henry Gao 
 
When it acceded to the WTO in 2001, China accepted comprehensive transparency 
obligations as well as substantive commitments covering both market access and rules issues. 
Initially designed to deal with the opaque trade law regime, the transparency obligations were 
also expected to help democratize the legislative process and promote the development of the 
rule of law in China. Now that more than 15 years have passed, have the transparency 
obligations fulfilled their original promises? This article answers the question by reviewing how 
the transparency obligations have worked in practice. It notes that, while transparency has 
improved in some areas, it is still lacking in other areas. The article discusses the reasons for the 
uneven progress, and concludes with some advice on how transparency may be further enhanced. 
 
I. Transparency Obligation in the WTO  
 
1. History of Transparency in the Multilateral Trading System 
 
Transparency has long been one of the most fundamental principles of the multilateral 
trading system. The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, for 
example, includes Article X: Publication and Administration of Trade Regulation, which sets the 
basic transparency obligation for GATT contracting parties. Steve Charnovitz pointed out that 
the origin of the provision can be traced back to the 1923 International Convention Relating to 
the Simplification of Customs Formalities,1 but Padideh Ala’i argued that, as the US proposed 
the language, the Article was heavily influenced by the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
which was passed in June 1946.2 According to Ala’i, as the APA has made the US administrative 
processes more transparent for foreign traders to conduct business in the US, the US proposed 
Article X in the GATT to level the playing field for US traders who often faced opaque and 
informal administrative structures in foreign markets.3  
 
The US draft, initially entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations--
Advance Notice of Restrictive Regulations”, was first incorporated as Article 38 in the Havana 
Charter for the International Trade Organization.4 When the ITO failed to come into being, it 
was inherited by the GATT as Article X under a slightly different title - “Publication and 
Administration of Trade Regulations”.5 Notwithstanding the minor change in title, the 
                                                          
1 Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927 
(2004), at p. 929. 
2 Padideh Ala’i & Mathew D'Orsi, Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role of the WTO, in 
Robert G. Vaughn (eds.), Research Handbook on Transparency, Edward Elgar, 2014, at p. 370. 
3 Id. 
4 Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 1 1998-1999, at p. 3. 
5 Id. 
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substantive content of the article remained the same.6  
 
However, the provision was rarely used in the GATT era. As noted by Charnovitz, in the 
history of the GATT, the only instance where a trade measure was challenged under Article X 
and found illegal was the 1989 case of European Economic Community –Restrictions on Imports 
of Apples (EEC-Apples), a complaint brought by the United States.7 Moreover, even in that case, 
transparency was not the main claim and was instead only incidental to the main claims on 
quantitative restrictions under Articles XI and XIII.8 According to Ala’i, the reason for the low 
usage during the GATT period is because the focus of trade negotiations in GATT, at least for its 
first two decades, was mainly on reduction of tariffs.9 As tariff is the most transparent trade 
measure, there is not much need to invoke the transparency obligation. Interestingly, this also 
explains why Article X was invoked in the EEC-Apples case, as it is mainly concerned with 
import quota, which by its nature is among the most opaque and non-transparent trade measures.  
 
With the establishment of the WTO, things have changed. The trade negotiations 
conducted under the auspices of the GATT was so successful that, by 1994, the average tariff for 
industrial countries have been drastically reduced from 20-30% in 1947 to less than 4%.10 
Instead of focusing on tariff reductions alone, the WTO has greatly expanded its scope to include 
many non-tariff barriers such as trade remedies measures, technical barriers, sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, services regulations, and intellectual property rights measures. Because most 
of these measures concern behind-the-border regulatory measures that are difficult to police, 
transparency has become “an indispensable element of the multilateral trading system”, as noted 
by the WTO in its official publication commemorating the 20 Year Anniversary of the WTO.11 
 
Transparency is not only important for existing issues already covered by the WTO legal 
framework, but also for new issues yet to be incorporated into the multilateral trading system. 
For example, in the Doha Declaration, the WTO Members repeatedly emphasized the important 
role played by transparency in addressing new issues such as investment, competition and 
government procurement.12  
 
2. Defining Transparency 
 
                                                          
6 Id., at pp. 3-4. 
7 Charnovitz, supra note 1, at pp. 933-934. 
8 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples – Complaint by the 
United States, L/6513, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88appleu.pdf. 
9 Ala’i & D'Orsi, supra note 2, at p.368. 
10 World Trade Organization, 2007 World Trade Report: Six Decades of Multilateral Cooperation, What Have we 
Learnt? Geneva: WTO, at pp. 207-209. 
11 WTO, The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements, Geneva: WTO, 2015, at p. 51. 
12 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001, Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, at paras. 20, 22, 25 and 26. 
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While the growing interests on transparency in recent years is a welcome development, it 
also leads to confusions as the transparency concept has been expanded to cover a wider range of 
issues. As noted half-jokingly by Sylvia Ostry, the word transparency is the “most opaque in the 
trade policy lexicon.”13 Thus, for the purpose of our discussion, it is important to clarify its 
meaning and differentiate the different types of transparency.  
 
Broadly speaking, the modern literature on transparency in the WTO can be divided into 
two categories: The first is domestic or regulatory, which covers the transparency of domestic 
trade-related laws and regulations of WTO members. This is the classical concept of 
transparency as embodied in Article X and the focus of the discussion in this paper. In recent 
years, however, more and more commentators started to focus on the transparency of the WTO 
itself as an international institution. They criticized the decision-making mechanism of the WTO 
as being too secretive and calls for more transparency in the WTO negotiation and dispute 
settlement process.14 I would classify this as international or institutional transparency, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
In turn, the obligations on regulatory transparency in the WTO framework can be further 
divided into the following two categories: 
 
A. General obligations that are universally applicable across many different sectors and 
range of measures. The primary example for this is Art. X of the GATT, which covers all trade 
measures affecting trade in goods. Similarly, GATS Art. III and TRIPS Art. 63 set out the 
transparency obligations for trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights 
respectively. As these two provisions are modelled after Art. X, we will concentrate on Art. X in 
our discussions.  
 
Titled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”, Art. X includes three 
paragraphs, two of which are relevant to the transparency obligation. Under the first paragraph, 
WTO Members are required to publish promptly all trade-related “laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of general application” and international trade agreements. 
Under the second paragraph, WTO Members may not enforce measures “effecting an advance in 
a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or imposing 
a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer 
of payments therefor … before such measure has been officially published”. 
 
B. Agreement-specific obligations that set out transparency obligations in various sector 
or measure-specific agreements. They mainly focus on due process and notification 
                                                          
13 Ostry, supra note 4, at p. 1.  
14 Many non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace, Public Citizen and Third World Network have 
criticized the WTO for being too secretive and un-democratic. See e.g., Lori Wallach & Patrick Woodall, Whose 
Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO. New York: New Press, 2004; Greenpeace, Why is the 
WTO a Problem?, 2003, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/why-is-the-
wto-a-problem/; Martin Khor, Developing Countries Decry WTO’s Secretive Talks, Third World Network, 
available at http://www.twn.my/title/1972.htm. For a good academic discussion of these criticisms, see Charnovitz, 
supra note 1.  
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requirements. For example, under Art. 6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and Art. 12 of the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, the investigating authorities shall not 
only provide public notices on the key stages in the investigation process but also give interested 
parties opportunity to supply information and participate in the investigation process. As noted 
by the WTO, these requirements “intended to increase the transparency of determinations, with 
the hope that this will increase the extent to which determinations are based on fact and solid 
reasoning”.15 As to the notification requirements, they can be found in almost every agreement 
ranging from the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)16 and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures Agreements17 to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).18 
 
As these transparency obligations differ in nature and effect, we can also divide them into 
the following two categories: 
 
A. Passive or paper transparency, which is mainly about the obligation to provide the 
information so as to help the traders to understand the various government regulations affecting 
trade. This include the publication obligation and the notification obligation as mentioned above. 
 
B. Positive or participatory transparency, which require the authorities to provide the 
information to various stakeholders to enable these actors to assess the implications and even 
influence policy making. Such provisions go beyond the narrow one-way publication and 
notification requirements under the previous category, and instead prescribe a two-way process 
whereby the authorities would provide the information to the stakeholders first, then the 
stakeholders are given an opportunity to comment on the information, and the authorities will 
then make the decision on the basis of the feedbacks from the stakeholders. Such requirements 
apply not only to the drafting of trade-related laws and regulations,19 but also to the decision-
making process in administrative proceedings such as anti-dumping and subsidy investigations. 
 
II. China-specific Transparency Obligations 
 
In China’s accession process, transparency was regarded as one of the most problematic 
areas. As summarized in the Working Party Report,   
“some members noted the difficulty in finding and obtaining copies of regulations and 
other measures undertaken by various ministries as well as those taken by provincial and other 
local authorities. Transparency of regulations and other measures, particularly of sub-national 
authorities, was essential since these authorities often provided the details on how the more 
general laws, regulations and other measures of the central government would be implemented 
and often differed among various jurisdictions. Those members emphasized the need to receive 
                                                          
15 WTO, Technical Information on Anti-dumping, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm. 
16 TBT Agreement, Art. 10. 
17 SPS Agreement, Art. 7. 
18 TRIMS Agreement, Art. 6. 
19 See e.g., SPS Agreement, Annex B, para. 5; TBT Agreement, Art. 2.9.2 and Annex 3, para. L. 
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such information in a timely fashion so that governments and traders could be prepared to 
comply with such provisions and could exercise their rights in respect of implementation and 
enforcement of such measures. The same members emphasized the importance of such pre-
publication to enhancing secure, predictable trading relations.”20 
 
To address these concerns, China agreed to the following China-specific obligations in 
addition to the general transparency obligations already contained in the existing agreements of 
the WTO: 
  
1. Publication obligation 
 
This is contained in Section 2.(C).1. of the Accession Protocol, which notes the 
following: 
“China undertakes that only those laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange that are published 
and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises, shall be enforced. In 
addition, China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all laws, regulations and 
other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of 
foreign exchange before such measures are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations, 
laws, regulations and other measures shall be made available at the latest when they are 
implemented or enforced.” 
 
This obligation goes beyond the normal publication obligation under GATT Art. X by 
adding the following elements. First, GATT Art. X.1 only requires the trade regulations to be 
“published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them” and does not set a specific deadline. In contrast, by stating that only trade 
regulations “that are published and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals and 
enterprises, shall be enforced”, Section 2.(C).1 essentially requires the publication takes place at 
least before the entry into force of the regulation.  
 
Second, while GATT Art. X.2 also requires certain trade regulations to be officially 
published before they are enforced, such obligation only applies to a very small set of trade 
regulations, i.e., those “effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an 
established and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, 
restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor”. Section 2.(C).1, 
however, greatly expands the scope of application by applying it to all “laws, regulations and 
other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign 
exchange”. This is even stricter than the transparency obligation under GATS Art. III.1, which, 
though requiring the publication of GATS regulations “by the time of their entry into force”, still 
provides for the exemption in emergency situations.  
 
Third, under GATT Art. X, a WTO Member is only required to publish the trade 
regulations, and the burden of finding such information is still on the foreign governments or 
                                                          
20 WTO Ministerial Conference: Fourth Session, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001, at para. 324. 
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traders. In contrast, Section 2.(C).1 requires the Chinese government to make such information 
available to WTO Members upon request from such Members. In other words, once the other 
WTO Members make a request, the burden of providing the information shifts to China. Under 
GATS Art.III.4, a WTO Member is also required to “respond promptly to all requests by any 
other Member for specific information” on services regulations. However, the obligation to 
respond is more procedural in nature and not as substantive as making available such regulations. 
Among the general publication obligations in the WTO Agreements, the closest to the Chinese 
obligation we can find is TRIPS Art. 63.3, which require a WTO Member to supply TRIPS-
related regulations to another Member. Yet even the TRIPS provision here falls short of the 
Chinese obligation in two important aspects. First, under the TRIPS, the obligation is only 
triggered by a written request, while the Chinese obligation does not specify this, which means 
that, at least in theory, even informal oral requests would work. Second, Section 2.(C).1 requires 
the regulations to be provided before such measures are implemented or enforced, or in 
emergency situations, at least when they are implemented or enforced. Again, such stringent pre-
implementation requirement cannot be found under the corresponding provisions in the GATT, 
GATS or TRIPS.   
 
While such detailed publication obligation is viewed by some commentators as 
discriminatory, it is badly needed for a country like China, which has been plagued by the 
widespread use of normative documents beneath the formal system of laws and administrative 
regulations.21 While their legality is questionable, they have been used extensively by 
administrative bodies, especially at the local level.22 As most of them are not published, they are 
especially problematic for foreign traders and firms. This problem is even recognized by Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin, who exhorted officials to use published and uniform laws and regulations 
rather than unpublished internal documents to exercise the government’s function to manage the 
economy.23 By casting a wide net with the publication obligation under Section 2.(C).1, other 
WTO Members finally have a way of pinning down these minor yet important documents and 
examining them.  
 
2. Official journal & comment 
 
Under Section 2.(C).2. of the Accession Protocol, China shall “establish or designate an 
official journal dedicated to the publication of all laws, regulations and other measures 
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange and, 
after publication of its laws, regulations or other measures in such journal, shall provide a 
reasonable period for comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures are 
implemented, except for those laws, regulations and other measures involving national security, 
specific measures setting foreign exchange rates or monetary policy and other measures the 
publication of which would impede law enforcement. China shall publish this journal on a 
                                                          
21 Ostry, supra note 4, at p. 13. 
22 Id. 
23 Jiang Zemin, Zai Jilie de Guoji Jingzheng zhong Zhangwo Zhudong (Seize the Initiative amidst Intense 
International Competition), in Jiang Zemin Wenxuan (Selected Works of Jiang Zemin), Vol. III, Renmin Chubanshe 
(People’s Publishing House), Beijing, 2006, at p. 454. 
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regular basis and make copies of all issues of this journal readily available to individuals and 
enterprises.” 
 
Again these two obligations cannot be found in the general transparency provisions in the 
GATT, GATS and TRIPS. While they all requires the publication of trade regulations, none of 
them requires that the publication must be made in one specific official journal or that 
opportunity to comment is provided before the implementation of the regulations. Instead, the 
right to comment obligation most likely draw its inspiration from the specialized agreements 
such as the TBT & Anti-dumping Agreements, which provides the right to comment in the 
formulation of technical standards,24 conformity assessment procedures,25 standards,26 adoption 
of provisional anti-dumping measures,27 and consideration of acceptance of price undertakings.28 
 
The obligation to establish an official journal specifically addresses the difficulty 
experienced by some WTO Members in “finding and obtaining copies of regulations and other 
measures undertaken by various ministries as well as those taken by provincial and other local 
authorities”, as noted in the Working Party Report.29 While the Ministry of Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) tried to eliminate them by establishing its own gazette for publication 
of all laws, regulations and administrative rules related to foreign trade and investments in 
October 1993, the gazette does not include state and local laws or normative documents.30 This is 
confirmed by the response to the Working Party by the representative of China, who noted that 
such regulations have to be found instead in a motley collection of publications: "Almanac of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade" and "The Bulletin of MOFTEC" published by 
MOFTEC; "Statistical Yearbook of China" published by the State Statistical Bureau; "China's 
Customs Statistics (Quarterly)" edited and published by the Customs; the "Collection of the 
Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China”; “The Treaty Series of the PRC"; the 
"Directory of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Enterprises"; "China's Foreign 
Trade Corporations and Organizations"; Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China; Gazette of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China; Collection of the Laws of the People's Republic of China; Collection of the 
Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China; Gazette of MOFTEC of the People's 
Republic of China; Proclamation of the People's Bank of the People's Republic of China; and 
Proclamation of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China.31 As such jungle of 
publications is difficult to navigate even for native Chinese, one could well imagine the relief 
that the foreign governments and traders must feel when China agreed to have one single Official 
                                                          
24 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.9. 
25 Id., Art. 5.6.  
26 Id., Annex 3, para, L. 
27 Anti-dumping Agreement, Art. 7.1. 
28 Id., Art. 8.3. 
29 Working Party Report on the Accession of China, supra note 20, at para. 324. 
30 Ostry, supra note 4, at p. 13. 
31 Working Party Report on the Accession of China, supra note 20, at paras. 325-330. 
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Publication for all these regulations.  
 
3. Enquiry point 
 
Under Section 2.(C).2. of the Accession Protocol, China shall “establish or designate an 
enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO Member all information 
relating to the measures required to be published under paragraph 2(C)1 of this Protocol may 
be obtained. Replies to requests for information shall generally be provided within 30 days after 
receipt of a request. In exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45 days after receipt of 
a request.  Notice of the delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the 
interested party. Replies to WTO Members shall be complete and shall represent the 
authoritative view of the Chinese government. Accurate and reliable information shall be 
provided to individuals and enterprises.” 
 
While the establishment of one Official Journal solves the problem of having to weed 
through various publications by many different agencies, it is still a daunting task to sift through 
the Journal as a foreigner is unlikely to know which volume or issue of the Journal he shall 
consult to find the specific regulation that addresses his particular problem. This explains the 
rationale for the obligation on the establishment of the enquiry point, which provides a much 
more efficient way to obtain information on specific measures compared to the wild goose chase 
a foreign trader may have to conduct on his own. 
 
Again this obligation cannot be found in the original Art. X of the GATT. Instead, its 
origin may be traced to Art. III.4 of the GATS, as well as similar articles under the TBT and SPS 
Agreements.32 At the same time, the provision also made further refinements as follows: 
 
First is the expansion of the scope of beneficiaries. Under both the GATS and SPS 
agreement, a Member is only obliged to provide information to other WTO Members. Even 
though the TBT agreement expands the coverage to “interested parties in other Members”, one 
may argue that this only covers parties in other Members and does not include parties which are 
present in the Member with the enquiry point. In other words, foreign investors might not benefit 
from this clause as they are already in the host country and thus are not “interested parties in 
other Members”. In contrast, such ambiguity would not arise under Section 2.(C).2, as it 
explicitly grant the right to request information to any individual or enterprise, without limitation 
on the location of the parties. Taken literally, this could even include purely domestic persons 
and firms from China.  
 
Second is the strict time limit. Under Section 2.(C).2, China shall provide reply to 
information requests within 30 days after receipt of a request. In exceptional cases, this could be 
extended to 45 days, but notice of the delay and the reasons shall be provided in writing to the 
interested party. Such strict time limit cannot be found in any of the WTO Agreements and is 
another innovation in the Accession Protocol. It ensures that the purpose of establishing the 
enquiry point would not be defeated by the delay tactics often resorted to by the bureaucracy. 
Even in cases of delay, the need to provide written notice and reasons also put pressure on the 
                                                          
32 See TBT Agreement, Art. 10.1; SPS Agreement, Annex, para. 3. 
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agency to provide a response in due course.  
 
The third feature is the most interesting, as it tries to specify the quality of the 
information. While the strict time limit mentioned above ensures that a reply will be provided in 
time, it alone cannot prevent the bureaucrats from providing information that is incomplete, 
inaccurate or ambiguous. To solve this problem, the Accession Protocol took the bold step by 
including a substantive safeguard that focuses on the quality of the information. Depending on 
who is the party making the request, the level of quality required is also different. For requests 
made by the government of a WTO Member, the reply shall be “complete” and “represent the 
authoritative view of the Chinese government”. This prevents the problem created by standard 
disclaimers such as “this only reflects the personal view of the official and does not represent the 
official view of the government”. A lower standard of quality applies to replies to requests by 
individuals and firms, but such replies should still be “accurate and reliable”.  
 
4. Translation 
 
Unlike the other obligations, the translation obligation is contained in para. 334 of the 
Working Party Report, which provides that:  
“The representative of China confirmed that China would make available to WTO 
Members translations into one or more of the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations 
and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of 
forex, and to the maximum extent possible would make these laws, regulations and other 
measures available before they were implemented or enforced, but in no case later than 90 days 
after they were implemented or enforced.” 
 
 This obligation is noted in paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report, which 
incorporates it as part of paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol. It addresses the lack of 
translations of trade regulations, which is a long-standing problem troubling foreign governments 
and traders. Without this obligation, the above-mentioned transparency obligations were largely 
worthless as the Chinese government could simply provide the Chinese version of the 
regulations. When the foreigners tried to translate these regulations, they were often told that 
their translations are inaccurate and does not correctly convey the original meaning in Chinese. 
With the addition of the translation obligation, the foreigners now have access to an official 
translation done by the Chinese government itself, which will be highly useful in their dealings 
with China. Moreover, the translation should be provided on a timely basis, normally before the 
implementation and latest no more than 90 days after the implementation.  
 
5. Transitional Review Mechanism 
 
The final obligation is the transitional review mechanism established by Section 18 of the 
Accession Protocol. This obligation applies on top of the normal Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) with the following additional features:  
 
First, the bodies conducting the reviews are different. The normal TPRM is conducted by 
the Trade Policy Review Body, which is established as a separate body according to the TPRM 
10 
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Agreement33 but in practice is the General Council exercising the function of trade policy 
review.34 In contrast, the transitional review is conducted by the General Council and the 
“subsidiary bodies of the WTO which have a mandate covering China's commitments under the 
WTO Agreement or [the Accession] Protocol”.35 To avoid confusion, the Accession Protocol 
further lists the bodies as including the three main councils, i.e., Council for Trade in Goods 
(CTG), Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Council for Trade in 
Services (CTS); and 13 committees, which include the Committee on Balance-of-Payments 
Restrictions under the General Council, the Committee on Trade in Financial Services under the 
CTS, and all of the 11 committees under the CTG, i.e., Committees on Market Access (covering 
also ITA), Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Anti-Dumping Measures, Customs Valuation, Rules of 
Origin, Import Licensing, Trade-Related Investment Measures, and Safeguards. As these 
councils and committees each specializes in separate agreements, they are more likely to have 
subject-matter expertise and the discussions will be more fruitful.   
 
Second, the scopes of reviews are also different. The TPRM reviews “individual 
Members' trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral 
trading system”. The Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM), on the other hand, covers not only 
China’s commitments under the WTO Agreements but also those in the Accession Protocol. In 
other words, even if a matter is not covered by the WTO Agreements but have been included in 
China’s Accession Protocol, it will be included in the Transitional Review. The latter includes, 
for example, China’s commitments to liberalize trading rights36 and to remove export taxes.37  
 
The third difference lies in the formats and procedures of the reviews. The TPRM has 
well established procedure, which starts with the preparation of a policy statement by the country 
under review and a report by the Secretariat, which are distributed before the review meeting.38 
The Members also submit written questions to the Members under review, which often provide 
written answers. At the review meeting, the Member under review will start with an opening 
remark, followed by the initial remark by a discussant, and then the floor is open for discussions. 
After the meeting, the Secretariat’s report and the policy statement are released, and the minutes 
of the meeting is also posted online. In contrast, the Transitional Review Mechanism does not 
specify any procedure. All it requires is for China to provide relevant information to the 
subsidiary bodies mentioned above before the review, and for the subsidiary bodies to report the 
result of the review to the relevant Council and General Council.39 The only exception is the 
                                                          
33 TPRM Agreement, Art. C.(i). 
34 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. IV.4. 
35 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, Section 18.1.  
36 Id., Section 5. 
37 Id., Section 11.3.  
38 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body, 
WT/TPR/6/Rev.3, 31 January 2012.  
39 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 35, Section 18.1.  
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review conducted by the General Council, which, pursuant to Annex 1B, shall follow the usual 
Rules of Procedure of the General Council. Annex 1A of the Accession Protocol lays down a 
very detailed list of information China shall provide, which includes a total of 7 categories and 
56 sub-categories. However, this seemingly onerous requirement is watered down by a footnote 
therein, which states that China may use the information it has already provided under the 
general notification requirements. Overall, compared to the normal TPRM, the Transitional 
Review Mechanism seems more like an ad hoc mechanism to address specific problems 
encountered by WTO Members rather than an institutionalized mechanism to review China’s 
trade policy in a systemic manner.  
 
Fourth, the frequencies of the reviews are also different. Under the TPRM, the frequency 
of review is determined by the share of world trade of the Member under review.40 The four 
largest traders are reviewed once every two years, the next four every four years, and the rest of 
the Membership every six years, with additional allowance for LDCs.41 When China joined the 
WTO, it ranked number six in world trade, which means it should be reviewed once every four 
years under the normal TPRM. Under the TRM, however, China will be reviewed every year for 
the first eight years, with a final review on the tenth year of its accession.42 This arrangement 
apparently reflects the concerns of WTO Members on whether China may smoothly implement 
its WTO obligation, especially in the first few years of the post-accession period.  
 
The fifth difference is the relationship of the review mechanisms with the dispute 
settlement mechanism. As the objective of the TPRM is to provide an opportunity to improve the 
transparency and understanding of the trade regimes of WTO Members, the TPRM Agreement 
explicitly states that the review is not “intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of 
specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures”.43 In contrast, 
the TRM takes the contrary approach by stating that “[c]onsideration of issues [under the TRM] 
shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of any Member, including China, under 
the WTO Agreement or any Plurilateral Trade Agreement, and shall not preclude or be a 
precondition to recourse to consultation or other provisions of the WTO Agreement or this 
Protocol”.44 In other words, the TRM could well provide an opportunity for WTO Members to 
collect information they might need to launch a complaint against China under the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  
 
As discussed above, these obligations go beyond the normal requirements under the 
WTO Agreements. Moreover, many of the transparency obligation in China’s Accession 
Protocol are highly intrusive. Such approach is in marked contrast to the rather cautious 
approach adopted in the WTO Agreements, which is summed up well by the acknowledgment in 
the TPRM Agreement that “the implementation of domestic transparency must be on a voluntary 
                                                          
40 TPRM Agreement, Article C(ii).  
41 Id.  
42 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 35, Section 18.4.  
43 TPRM Agreement, Article. A(i). 
44 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 35, Section 18.3. 
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basis and take account of each Member's legal and political systems”.45 Why then, does the 
WTO Members choose to adopt such a bold approach towards China? Some commentators 
argued that there was no reason at all.46 However, in the view of the author, such stringent 
obligations reflect the deep concerns by WTO Members over the lack of transparency in China. 
By including these lengthy and meticulous obligations, the Members hope to beef up the 
transparency obligation with specific guidelines on the implementation. If implemented well, 
these transparency obligations could benefit China itself too. However, as we will see in the next 
Section, the expectations do not always match up with the reality.  
 
III. China’s Implementation Record 
 
Upon its accession to the WTO, the most urgent task facing China was the 
implementation of the substantive obligations, including reducing goods tariffs, removing non-
tariff barriers, and opening services markets.47 To implement these obligations, the Chinese 
government also conducted a comprehensive review and revision of the trade related laws and 
regulations. The work is coordinated by the WTO Legal Affairs Leading Group, which was 
established in early 2000 and led by then MOFTEC Minister Shi Guangsheng.48 The detailed 
work was conducted by the WTO Legal Affairs Team, which was established in late 2000 and 
composed of lower-level officials. There were two phases in the work: the first phase was 
mapping of existing laws and regulations, which totalled 1,413 regulatory documents and 
includes 6 laws, 164 administrative regulations (including 110 internal regulations), 887 
departmental rules (including 195 internal documents), 191 bilateral trade agreements, 72 
bilateral investment agreements, and 93 double taxation treaties.49 In the second phase, these 
regulatory documents were reviewed by the Team, which decided to repeal, revise, retain them 
or enact new legislations. When the Team completed its work in August 2002, it has revised 210 
regulatory documents, while 559 and 450 such documents were repealed and retained 
respectively.50  
 
Similar work was also conducted at the local government level pursuant to the Advice on 
Adapting to out WTO Accession Process and Clean Up Local Regulations, Rules and Other 
Policy Instruments issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP and the 
                                                          
45 TPRM Agreement, Article. B. 
46  See e.g., Julia Ya Qin, 'WTO-Plus' Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal 
System - An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol. Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 483-522, 2003, 
at p.510; Chen, Sijie, China's Compliance with WTO Transparency Requirement: Institution-Related Impediments 
(2012). Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 25-50, 2012, at p. 37.  
47 See Shi Miaomiao, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of its Accession 
Commitments, in Henry Gao & Donald Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, London, 
2005, at pp. 28-33.  
48 Yang Guohua, Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi Yu Zhongguo (World Trade Organization and China), Qinghua Daxue 
Chubanshe (Tsinghua University Press), Beijing, 2015, at p. 133. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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General Office of the State Council.51 The work was completed in June 2002 with more than 
190,000 local regulations, rules and other policy instruments revised or repealed.52  
 
In contrast, the implementation of procedural commitments such as the transparency 
obligation took the back seat. While it is undeniable that the transparency of its trade regime has 
been gradually improving since accession, most of the progress were achieved due to persistent 
nudging and even complaining by other WTO Members, led by the US and EU. Overall, 15 
years after China’s accession, it is fair to say that China is now largely in compliance with its 
transparency obligations, but problems still remain in some areas. In this section, we will 
examine in detail the implementation of the individual obligations.  
 
1. Official journal & publication 
 
As mentioned earlier, at the time of accession, China did not have an official journal 
dedicated to trade laws and regulations. Instead, the information on trade laws and regulations 
are scattered through newspapers, websites and journals published by many different agencies.  
 
To implement the obligation, MOFTEC could either establish a new journal, or use the 
existing MOFTEC Gazette as mentioned earlier. MOFTEC decided to choose the latter option. 
However, there is a problem with this approach: as the MOFTEC Gazette is a publication by 
MOFTEC, it would not have the power to collect and publish the laws and regulations made by 
other agencies and local governments, which are parallel to MOFTEC in the administrative 
hierarchy. To solve the problem, MOFTEC proposed to the State Council to rename the 
“MOFTEC Gazette” as “China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette”. On June 3, 
2002, the State Council approved the renaming request by MOFTEC and designated the Gazette 
as the official journal.53 This is not just a simple change of name. Instead, as the establishment of 
the Gazette is sanctioned by the State Council and the name now starts with “China”, the Gazette 
has been elevated from the publication of a Ministry into an official publication of the Chinese 
government. While the Gazette is still edited and distributed by MOFTEC,54 it now has the 
power to request information on trade-related laws and regulations from other Ministries, local 
governments, which have been urged by the State Council to “provide positive support and 
cooperation”.55  
 
On October 18, 2002, the first trial issue of the China Foreign Trade and Economic 
                                                          
51 Id., at p. 155. 
52 Id., at p. 156. 
53 Guowuyuan Bangongting (State Council General Office), Guanyu Luxing Woguo Jiaru Shjie Maoyi Zuzhi 
Yidingshu Toumingdu Tiaokuan Youguan Wenti de Fuhan (Reply on Issues concerning the Implementation of the 
Transparency Provision in China’s WTO Accession Protocol), Guobanhan [2002] No. 42, June 3, 2002, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61584.htm. 
54 Id., para. 1. 
55 Id., para. 2.  
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Cooperation Gazette was published.56 After 12 trial issues in 2002, the Gazette became a formal 
publication in 2003.57 Since then, the Gazette has been regularly published with 80 issues every 
year. However, as late as 2005, foreign governments and lawyers still complained about the 
failure of China to implement the obligation to establish the official journal, as many of them are 
not aware of the Gazette.58 According to some studies, the problem is that the Gazette doesn’t 
include the laws and regulations by local governments, and foreigners still have to scourge many 
different sources for such information.59  
 
To address this issue, the State Council issued the Notice on Further Improving the 
Relevant Work on the Implementation of the Transparency Provisions in China’s WTO 
Accession Protocol on March 30, 2006.60 The first paragraph of the Notice reaffirmed the status 
of the Gazette as the Official Journal of the Chinese government in publishing trade-related laws 
and regulations. The second paragraph further clarifies the ambiguous language of providing 
“positive support and cooperation” in the 2002 reply by explicitly requiring all central 
government agencies and local governments shall “forward to MOFCOM copies of trade-related 
laws and regulations either at the time of publication of such regulations or when the drafts are 
released for public comments so that they can be published in a timely manner in the Gazette.” In 
the last paragraph, MOFCOM is also asked to “actively coordinate and cooperate with relevant 
parties to implement the transparency commitments fully and timely.” 
 
Notwithstanding the high-level exhortation from the State Council, however, the 
implementation of the Official Journal and Publication obligations have remained uneven until 
today. The first problem is the lack of coverage of sub-central governmental measures.61 For 
example, of the 80 volumes of the Gazette published in 2016, only two mentioned local 
regulations.62 On the other hand, at the Central Government level, the Gazette usually covers 
                                                          
56 MOFTEC, Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Wengao Shikanhao Jinri Chuban Faxing (Trial Issue of China Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette Recently Published), October 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/200210/20021000043894.shtml.  
57 Id.  
58 Paolo D. Farah, Five Years of China WTO Membership: EU and US Perspectives About China's Compliance 
With Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism. Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 
Kluwer Law International, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 263-304, August 2006, at p. 281. 
59 Id, at pp. 281-282. 
60 State Council General Office, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Luxing Woguo Jiaru Shijie 
Maoyi Zuzhi Yidingshu Toumingdu Tiaokuan Xiangguan Gongzuo de Tongzhi (Notice on Further Improving the 
Relevant Work on the Implementation of the Transparency Provision in China’s WTO Accession Protocol), 
Guobanfa [2006] No. 23., March 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_283942.htm.  
61 United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2016 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 
2017, at p. 163. 
62 MOFCOM General Office, 2016 nian Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Wengao Zongmulu (Master Table of 
Contents for the 2016 China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette), available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/201601/20160101244294.shtml. The two mentioning local regulation are 
Volumes 43 and 45. 
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only the regulations made by agencies with close working relationship with MOFCOM, such as 
Customs Administration, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of 
Finance, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and State 
Food and Drug Administration. Moreover, even for the trade-related measures by the covered 
agencies, the Gazette usually only publishes regulations and departmental rules, and rarely 
publishes other legal instruments such as opinions, circulars, orders, directives and notices.63  
 
2. Public comment 
 
In a way, China’s efforts to implement the obligation on public comment started even 
before its accession to the WTO. The Law on Legislation (LL) enacted in March 2000, for 
example, include several provisions on collecting public comments through various means.64 
Closer examination reveals, however, that the provisions in the Law fall short of meeting China’s 
WTO commitment in several ways. First, the LL only provides for public comment process for 
laws made by the NPCSC and Administrative Regulations made by the State Council. Second, 
under the LL, public comment is not mandatory in the legislative process. Third, under the LL, 
public comment process is not a pre-condition for the implementation of the relevant laws and 
regulations. Therefore, the public comment process has rarely been used. In the eight years 
following the enactment of the LL, public comments have only been sought on the drafts of five 
laws.65  
 
To address these problems, the State Council issued two administrative regulations on 
Nov 16, 2001, 5 days after China signed its Protocol of Accession. The first regulation, 
Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations,66 specifies the 
legislative procedure for administrative regulations made by the State Council. The second 
regulation, Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules,67 applies to departmental 
rules made by the Ministerial-level agency under the State Council, or the local rules made by 
local governments at the provincial-level or major municipal level. Of the two, the second 
regulation is more interesting as it expands the scope of the public comment process to 
departmental and local rules. It also provides more specific guidelines on the organization of 
public hearings in Article 15. However, the two regulation share the same weakness as the LL, 
i.e., the public comment process is still not mandatory and not a pre-condition for the 
implementation of the relevant regulations. Thus, it is not surprising that little has changed with 
                                                          
63 USTR, supra note 61, at p. 163. 
64 Law on Legislation, enacted by the third meeting of the Ninth People’s Congress and promulgated by the No. 31 
Order by the President on March 15, 2000, Arts. 34, 58. 
65 They are Law on Marriage (Amendments), Law on Property, Law on Labour Contracts, Law on Promotion of 
Employment, Law on Prevention of Water Pollution. See Li Shishi, Guanyu Quanguo Renda Changweihui de Lifa 
Gongzuo (On the Legislative Work of the NPC Standing Committee), available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2013-06/25/content_1798343.htm. 
66 State Council, Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of 
Administrative Regulations), State Council Order No. 321, November 16, 2001.  
67 State Council, Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules), State 
Council Order No. 322, November 16, 2001. 
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the introduction of these two regulations. As noted by the USTR, the relevant agencies usually 
would only consult with other agencies, Chinese firms and experts.68 Occasionally, selected 
foreign firms might be consulted, but the drafts would not be shared with them.69 
 
In November 2003, MOFCOM issued Interim Measures on Administrative Transparency 
in the MOFCOM.70 Article II states that, in principle, draft regulations of MOFCOM shall be 
published to the public. Article IV(i)(3) further provides that, if any MOFCOM draft regulations 
or rules directly affect the substantive interests of citizens, legal persons or other organizations, 
and relevant citizens, legal persons or other organizations have major disagreements over certain 
provisions of the draft, the MOFCOM shall publish the draft through governmental website and 
collect comments and suggestions from such individuals and organizations. This provision could 
be a major step forward in the implementation of the public comment obligation, as at least 
arguably, all trade regulations can be said to directly affect the substantive interests of 
individuals or firms. However, as the provision also requires major disagreements over the draft 
by such individuals or firms, it falls short of complying with the public comment obligation, 
which requires comment process for all regulations.    
 
On April 15, 2008, the Standing Committee of the 11th NPC decided at the 2nd 
Chairman’s Meeting that, to further promote scientific legislation and democratic legislation, all 
draft laws to be reviewed by the NPCSC shall normally be published to collect public 
comments.71 Starting from the draft Food Safety Law, which was published on April 20, all draft 
laws have since been published on the website of the NPC and some important laws have also 
been published in the major news media.72 With this decision and the subsequent publication of 
draft laws for public comments, China has essentially implemented its public comment 
obligation with regard to national laws. 
 
In October 2010, the State Council issued Opinions on Strengthening the Building of a 
Government Ruling by Law,73 which provides that, except those made confidential by law, the 
drafts of all administrative regulations and departmental and local rules shall be published for 
public comment, and provide feedbacks on whether such comments are adopted through 
appropriate means. In July 2011, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) 
published Interim Measures on Solicitation of Public Comment on Draft Laws and Regulations 
                                                          
68 USTR, supra note 61, at p.165. 
69 Id.  
70 MOFCOM, Shangwubu Guanyu Yinfa “Shangwubu Zhengwu Gongkai Zanxing Banfa” de Tongzhi (MOFCOM 
Notice on the Issuance of Interim Measures on Administrative Transparency), Shangbanfa [2003] No. 444, 
November 25, 2003.  
71 Ai Zhihong, Quanguo Renda Changweihui xiang Shehui Gongbu Falu Caoan Gongzuo de Huigu yu Sikao 
(Reflections on the Work on Publishing Legislative Drafts to the Public by the NPC Standing Committee), March 
27, 2014, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/rdlt/rdjs/2014-03/27/content_1857231.htm. 
72 Id.  
73 State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe de Yijian (Opinions on Strengthening the 
Building of a Government Ruling by Law), Guofa [2010] No. 33, October 20, 2010. 
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and the Notice on Related Issues Regarding Solicitation of Public Comments on Draft 
Departmental Rules,74 and further refined the details for the public comment process. According 
to the Interim Measures, the draft laws, administrative legislations and departmental rules shall 
be published on the website of China Government Law Information, which is maintained by 
SCLAO.75  It also provides that the commenting period for draft administrative regulations shall 
normally be no less than 30 days except in cases of emergency.  
 
The introduction of these detailed rules has gradually established the public comment 
procedure. Nowadays, the system seems to be working well for the public comment process on 
laws and regulations. However, problems still remain for departmental rules. For example, 
during the public comment process for the draft Internet Domain Name Administration Rules 
made by the MIIT in 2016, many netizens reported that they either could not vote at all, or even 
if they could vote, the results and number of votes didn’t change after they click the vote 
button.76 This episode illustrates how hard it is to change the old habits of the bureaucrats and 
fully implement the public comment obligation. 
 
Another problem is normative documents, which are regulatory documents that do not 
fall into the category of administrative regulations or departmental rules. While their legality is 
dubious as they do not follow the normal legislative procedure, they can have major effect on 
individuals and firms.77 While a relic from the pre-reform era, they are still widely used today, 
especially at the local government level. The US has repeatedly pushed for the use of public 
comment procedure for these documents, but China is still rather reluctant to follow the advice.78 
 
Also, at the local government level, the implementations of the public comment 
obligation vary across different regions. In general, the more developed coastal regions tend to 
have better track records than the backward inland areas. For example, Guangzhou and Beijing 
has introduced transparency requirements for normative documents.79 Another example is 
Shenzhen, which in November 2000 became the first city in China to hold a hearing on a draft 
local regulation according to detailed hearing procedure.80 In May 2016, Shenzhen went even 
                                                          
74 State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi Falu Fagui Caoan Gongkai Zhengqiu 
Yijian Zanxing Banfa (Interim Measures on Solicitation of Public Comment on Draft Laws and Regulations and the 
Notice on Related Issues Regarding Solicitation of Public Comments on Draft Departmental Rules), July 22, 2011.  
75 Article 2. 
76 Cao Guoxing, “Hulianwang Yuming Guanli Banfa” Zhengqiu Yijian Wangye bei Dongshoujiao Buxu Fandui 
(Commenting Page on “Internet Domain Name Administration Rules” Compromised and No Objections Allowed ), 
Radio France Internationale, March 30, 2016. 
77 For a good discussion of the problem of normative documents, see Chen Sijie, supra note 46, at pp. 44-47.. 
78 USTR, supra note 61, at p. 167. 
79 Chen, supra note 46, at pp. 46-47. 
80 Li Guiru, Shenzhen Shoukai Lifa Tingzhenghui (Shenzhen became the First City in China to hold a Legislative 
Hearing), China Youth Daily, November 30, 2000, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/11/20001130/332147.html. 
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further by holding China’s first legislative hearing through Wechat, the most popular social 
messaging app in China.81 Moreover, to ensure the compliance of the local regulations with the 
substantive obligations of the WTO, Shenzhen also issued the Rules on the Review of the 
Consistency of the Trade Policies of Shenzhen City with WTO Rules in 2012.82 According to the 
Rules, the Shenzhen government shall submit draft trade-related regulations for review by the 
Shenzhen WTO Affairs Centre.83 The Shenzhen Rules was the first in the nation and has also 
inspired the State Council and MOFCOM to issue the nationwide Trade Policy Compliance 
Rules in 2014.84   
 
3. Enquiry points 
 
Compared to the other commitments, the obligation to establish enquiry points is much 
easier to implement as it is a one-off exercise and does not involve substantive issues. On 
November 1, 2001, MOFTEC announced the establishment of China WTO Notification and 
Enquiry Centre, a Departmental level agency along with two others: Department of WTO Affairs 
and Department of Fair Trade.85 On January 1, 2002, MOFTEC published the Interim Measures 
on Enquiries to the China WTO Enquiry Centre and specified the objectives, scope, method and 
response time for the enquiries.86 According to the Interim Measures, the enquiry shall be 
submitted in written form, and a written response will be given in 30 working days. To ensure 
the accuracy and authoritativeness of the enquiry response, MOFTEC also formed an Expert 
Group for the Enquiry Work composed of WTO experts and scholars from MOFTEC, other 
governmental agencies and relevant research institutes.87 On January 14, the Enquiry Centre 
started its operations.88 To further facilitate the submission of inquiries, on September 12, 2002, 
                                                          
81 Zhang Wei, Shenzhen jiang Juxing Weixin Lifa Tingzheng, Ciju wei Guonei Shoushi (Shenzhen to hold 
Legislative Hearing Through Wechat, The First of Its Kind in China), Southern Daily, May 5, 2016, available at 
http://www.fzgd.org/fzcj/sz/201605/t20160505_768384.htm.  
82 MOFCOM Special Commissioner’s Office in Shenzhen, Shenzhen Maoyi Zhengce Hegui Gongzuo de Shijian 
Tansuo (Experiments in the Trade Policy Compliance Work of Shenzhen), November 23, 2015, available at 
http://sms.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_myzchggz/lanmufive/201511/20151101192419.shtml. 
83 Shenzhen Municipal Government General Office, Guanyu Yinfa “Shenzhenshi Maoyi Zhengce Fuhe Shijie 
Maoyi Zuzhi Guize Shencha Banfa” de Tongzhi (Notice on the Issuance of “Rules on the Review of the Consistency 
of the Trade Policies of Shenzhen City with WTO Rules”) Shenfuban [2012] No. 42, July 25, 2012, Article 5. 
84 See State Council General Office, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Maoyi Zhengce Hegui 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (Notice on Further Improving the Trade Policy Compliance Work), Guobanfa [2014] No. 29, 
June 9, 2014, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/17/content_8887.htm; MOFCOM, Maoyi 
Zhengce Hegui Gongzuo Shishi Banfa [Shixing] (Implementing Rules on Trade Policy Compliance Work 
[Interim]), December 12, 2012, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201412/20141200833105.shtml. 
85 Xinhua News Agency, Zhongguo Jiaru WTO Yizhounian Dashiji (Major Events During China’s First Year in the 
WTO), December 10, 2002, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2002-12/10/content_655140.htm. 
86 MOFCOM, Zhongguo Zhengfu WTO Zixundian Zixun Banfa [Shixing] (Interim Measures on Enquiries to the 
China WTO Enquiry Centre), January 1, 2002.  
87 Zhongguo Jiji Luxing Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi Chengnuo (China has Diligent Implemented its WTO Accession 
Commitments), October 31, 2005, available http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/content_87694.htm. 
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MOFCOM also established a dedicated website: MOFTEC WTO Enquiry Website 
(www.chinawto.gov.cn).89 In 2006, the website also added the function of enquiries on China’s 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and was renamed WTO/FTA Enquiry Website, with the URL 
also changed to http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn.90  
 
In addition to this, other ministries and agencies have also established enquiry points for 
issues within their respective jurisdiction. The works of these enquiry points are generally 
regarded as satisfactory. For example, in its 2016 Report, the USTR noted that “[s]ince the 
creation of these various enquiry points, U.S. companies have generally found these various 
enquiry points to be responsive and helpful, and they have generally received timely replies.”91 
However, problems still remain in particular issue areas, especially those that fall under the 
jurisdiction of different agencies. One example is TBT notifications. The main agency in charge 
here is the State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), 
which has a TBT inquiry point. According to the USTR, the inquiry point does a good job in 
notifying measures by AQSIQ, as well as those by the National Certification and Accreditation 
Administration and Standardization Administration of China.92 However, the notification is 
lacking for measures by other agencies such as Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, the State Environmental Protection Administration and State Food and 
Drug Administration.93  
 
4. Translations  
 
Among all transparency-related obligations, translation is one of the hardest to 
implement, as it is a continuous obligation involving sustained efforts. Moreover, unlike other 
obligations such as publication, public comment and enquiry points, the translation obligation by 
its nature only benefits foreigners. Thus, it is prone to be put on the backlog by the bureaucrats 
due to the lack of relevance to domestic constituencies.   
 
For these reasons, it’s no wonder that the translation obligation has a poor 
implementation record. Until 2015, China has only translated on a regular basis the trade-related 
laws and administrative regulations, but not the numerous departmental or local rules.94 
Moreover, China has been “years behind” in publishing the translations, which are typically only 
made available after implementation rather than before.95 After repeated complaints from the US, 
                                                          
89 MOFTEC, “Duiwai Maoyi Jingji Hezuobu WTO Zixun Wang” 9 yue 13 ri Kaitong (“MOFTEC WTO Enquiry 
Website” established on September 13), September 16, 2002, available at 
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90 WTO/FTA Enquiry Website, Guanyu Women (About Us), available at 
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91 USTR, supra note 61, at p. 167.  
92 Id., at p. 91. 
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the State Council issued the Notice on Improving the Translation Work of Trade-related 
Departmental Rules on March 16, 2015.96 The Notice requires all ministries and agencies to 
publish, in principle, official English translations of the relevant departmental rules through their 
websites or other means before implementation. In exceptional cases, the English translation 
shall be published no later than 90 days after the implementation. While this Notice partly solved 
the problem for departmental rules, no similar requirements have been made for laws, 
administrative regulations and local rules. In response to pressures from the US, China agreed in 
2016 to find ways to comply with its obligation.97  
 
In several WTO disputes, translation has become an issue. The first is the China – 
Publications and Audiovisual Products case, which was brought by the US in 2007. While the 
US did not make a formal claim for the violation of the translation obligation in the case, 
translation did become a hot issue in the case. The problem arose because the US and China each 
provided different translations of certain key terms of the Chinese measures.98 At the request of 
the panel, they were able to agree on the translation of some but not all the terms in question.99 In 
October 2008, the panel proposed to engage the UN Office at Geneva (UNOG) as a neutral 
independent translator.100 However, in November 2008, the parties were informed that, due to 
the current workload and resource constraints, the UNOG might not be able to complete the 
translation in time.101 The US proposed to use a private translation company instead but China 
did not like the alternative.102 In December 2008, the issue was finally resolved when the United 
Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON) agreed to provide a timely translation, which was submitted 
in February 2009.103  
 
While there are three different translations of many key terms, the Panel used the 
translation by the US in most cases. In a footnote in the Panel Report, the Panel explained the 
rationale for its approach: 
“Because the United States is the complaining party and bears the burden of providing 
evidence of the content of the Chinese measures being challenged, as a general rule, when 
referring to one of China's laws, regulations or documents the Panel will utilize the US 
translation, unless the specific provision is one which the parties agreed to utilize China's 
                                                          
96 State Council General Office, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Zuohao yu Maoyi Xiangguan Bumen Guizhang 
Yingwen Fanyi Gongzuo de Tongzhi (Notice on Improving the Translation Work of Trade-related Departmental 
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97 USTR, supra note 61, at p. 165. 
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translation or if based on the advice of the independent translator the Panel finds that the US 
translation is inappropriate. However, we have reviewed both translations and may refer to 
China's versions to confirm our understanding of the measures. Our citation to the US 
translation should not be construed as necessarily implying that it is an authoritative translation 
of China's measures or that we believe the United States is in a better position to provide an 
English translation of China's internal measures.”104 
 
Altogether, the Panel identified 10 key terms where the Parties disagreed on the 
translations.105 Among the 10, the Panel used the US translation for 5 terms, which includes 3 
terms that China claimed to be “unique terms that can find no English word matching its exact 
meaning” and thus did not provide translation.106 The Chinese translation was only adopted for 
one term.107 As for the remaining 4 terms, the Panel did not choose a specific translation as it 
found that the translation differences would not affect its ruling.108  
 
Probably learning from its unpleasant experience in the China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products case, the US has included among its claims China’s alleged failure to 
implement the translation commitment in several subsequent disputes. For example, on 
December 22, 2010, the United States requested consultations with China concerning certain 
measures providing grants, funds, or awards to enterprises manufacturing wind power 
equipment. In the Request for Consultation, the US alleged that China has violated its translation 
commitment by failing to provide the translation of the Notice of the Ministry of Finance on 
Issuing the Provisional Measure on Administration of Special Fund for Industrialization of Wind 
Power Equipment, including the Annex on Provisional Measures on Administration of Special 
Fund for Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.109 Similarly, in the 2012 case of China — 
Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries110 and the case of 
China — Tax Measures Concerning Certain Domestically Produced Aircraft111 in 2015, the US 
also alleged failure to provide translation of 73 and 4 measures respectively. As these cases have 
not lead to panel reports, it is still unclear how a panel will rule on these issues.  
 
For a continuous obligation like translation, the best way to implement is establishing an 
institutional mechanism. However, China has yet to establish such a mechanism and all 
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translations are done on an ad hoc basis. In the 2016 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO 
Compliance, the US suggested China follow the example of the EU. However, this is not a 
feasible solution as China is not a multi-racial and multi-language country. Indeed, due to its 
special nature, the EU is an anomaly among WTO Members and is more like an international 
organization in many aspects. 
 
Instead, the author suggests that China could draw inspirations from the China – 
Publications and Audiovisual Products case by outsourcing the translation work. The MOFCOM 
has been outsourcing its work since Feb 2015, when the Department of WTO Affairs issued a 
call for tender for the translation of the documents used in China’s WTO notification and review 
process.112 In March 2015, two contractors won the bid, with the top choice being Zhonglun, a 
leading Chinese law firm.113 While the scope of this tender covers only the documents used in 
China’s WTO notification and review processes,114 there is no reason why the same approach 
could not be adopted for the translation obligation as well.   
 
5. Transitional Review Mechanism 
 
As the transitional review mechanism does not involve any substantive obligation, one 
may assume that it is rather easy to implement. However, as it turned out, this has become one of 
the most contentious areas of implementation, primarily due to the lack of detailed procedural 
rules in the Accession Protocol. 
 
The first problem concerned the timing of the review. Section 18.1 only states that the 
WTO subsidiary bodies “shall, within one year after accession… review… the implementation 
by China”. The US interpreted this to mean that the review is a continuous process with “WTO 
Members… rais[ing] their concerns regarding China's implementation throughout the course of 
the year within the relevant WTO bodies and Committees”.115 China, however, argued that the 
review is a one-off annual exercise with “only one annual review”.116 Thus, when the US tried to 
start the review process soon after China’s accession by putting China's implementation of its 
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services commitments on the agenda of the regular meeting of Council for Trade in Services on 
March 27, 2002, China refused to discuss them on the ground that they are too complicated and 
should be raised in the formal review process instead. 117 After some haggling between China 
and the other WTO Members, they finally agreed that the first TRM review would be held at the 
last regular meetings of the respective subsidiary bodies in 2002.118 
 
After the timing issue was resolved, another battle was fought over the timetable for the 
submission of the information required in the review. The Accession Protocol only specifies the 
timetable for the review by the General Council by noting, in Annex 1B, that China “shall submit 
any information and the documentation relating to the review no later than 30 days prior to the 
date of the review.” As to the reviews by the subsidiary bodies, there is no such explicit 
requirement and China is only required to “provide relevant information, including information 
specified in Annex 1A, to each subsidiary body in advance of the review.” The US again took an 
expansive interpretation by proposing the following: first, China should submit the relevant 
information set out in Annex 1A 90 days before the respective meetings; second, other Members 
shall submit their specific questions for China 60 days before the meeting; and three, China 
should submit its responses to Members' questions 30 days before the meeting.119 This proposal 
was again rejected by China, which insisted that no specific time-frame or procedure may be 
imposed as they go beyond the stipulated obligation under Section 18.120 In the end, China only 
submitted the relevant information, on average, three days before the scheduled meeting.121 Such 
late submission made it very hard for the other Members to react to China’s submissions.122 
 
Another contentious issue was whether China shall provide written replies to Members’ 
questions during the review. Section 18 is again silent on the issue, as it doesn’t even explicitly 
state that other Members may raise questions. The US took the view that there may be an 
exchange of written questions and answers before the review meeting.123 Based on the 
understanding, some Members submitted written questions from as early as August 2002.124 
China, however, insisted that it was under no obligation to provide written replies under the 
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TRM.125 When the US complained that the lack of written response made it difficult to conduct 
the review,126 China proposed to “convene an informal meeting outside of the transitional review 
mechanism process” so that the “Chinese experts could provide more information to the 
questions raised by any interested Members”.127 However, the US rejected the proposal as they 
preferred “to have a formal record of the discussions including China's responses.”128 As the 
other Members were also not receptive, China withdrew the proposal.129 
 
A related issue is whether Members may submit follow-up questions to China after the 
review meeting. This issue was first raised by Chinese Taipei during the first review130 and was 
echoed by the US131 and Japan.132 China refused to accept written questions post-meeting on the 
ground that the review takes place only once a year at the designated meeting.133  
 
As mentioned earlier, Section 18.1 requires the subsidiary bodies to report the results of 
the review to the relevant Councils, which shall in turn report to the General Council. However, 
it does not specify the nature or content of such reports. Under Section 18.2, the General Council 
shall conduct the review in light of the reviews conducted by the subsidiary bodies, and “may 
make recommendations to China”. Reading the two parts together, one might argue that, to help 
the General Council to make such recommendations, the reports by the subsidiary bodies shall 
include more substantive analysis on whether China has implemented its commitments. This was 
indeed the view taken by Japan.134 However, this view was rejected by the committee Chairman 
on practical grounds, as the adoption of such a report would require a consensus, which would be 
impossible to obtain given the differences between China and other Members.135 For the same 
reason, even the final report by the General Council did not include any specific 
recommendations.136  
 
In summary, it seems that China has largely won the battle on the TRM by insisting on a 
strict textualist and minimalist interpretation of its obligations under the Accession Protocol. 
While Members like the US, EU, and Japan were unhappy, they had no choice but quietly 
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accepted this and simply used the TRM to request more information from China on the various 
issues they were concerned with, mostly concerning transparency and procedural issues in 
various Chinese trade measures.137 In 2006, however, China became even more impatient with 
the TRM, when it also had to field the Trade Policy Review Mechanism for the first time. The 
TPRM was held in April 2006. When the TRM was conducted later that year, China raised 
several issues. First, some Members used the TRM to request answers for questions raised during 
the TPRM.138 China regarded this as inappropriate as the two are separate processes and thus 
refused to answer these questions. However, when the US pressed further by asking if this were 
the official position of China,139 China backed off and agreed to provide oral replies.140 Second, 
some questions were raised repeatedly in several committees. For example, the same question 
concerning the Chinese Compulsory Certification (CCC) regulation was raised in the Market 
Access Committee, the TBT Committee and the CTG.141 China was concerned that this would 
turn the TRM from a once-per-year event into a multiple-times-per-year exercise.142 This led to a 
spirited retort from the EU, which noted that they not only had to raise the same questions in 
different committees, but also had been putting the same questions for five years because they 
are not getting answers.143 In response, China accused the EU of applying double standard by 
asking China to reduce its exports on products such as textile while complaining that China 
should not restrict its exports on certain raw materials.144 However, eventually, China also 
softened its stance by agreeing to address issues even if they are raised in several committees.145 
 
While this episode did not really change China’s practice in the TRM, it did provide 
some interesting insights into China’s perception of the TRM. Instead of viewing it as a useful 
exercise to help China to implement its WTO obligations, as suggested by the US and EU, China 
regarded it more as a source of burden and humiliation. As noted by China’s first WTO 
Ambassador, from the beginning, the TRM has been viewed as an additional burden and 
discriminatory measure by China.146 However, until 2006, China largely kept such view to itself 
and did not publicly denounce it. However, when China went through the TPRM in 2006, it 
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received over one thousand questions, while the US received less than one thousand questions in 
their last TPR.147 Moreover, China noted that it took the US nine months to provide answers, 
while Members pressed China for answers after less than six month.148 That is why China 
snapped and openly called the TRM discriminatory.149    
 
In a way, China’s confrontational behaviour in the TRM can be explained by the fact that 
the TRM, unlike the TPRM, may be used by WTO Members to collect information to be used in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. To avoid self-incrimination, it is understandable that 
China took an ultra-cautious approach by refusing to provide written answers. Had the TRM 
been designed more like the TPRM, it might, paradoxically, have been more effective in getting 
China to improve its implementation of WTO commitments.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
From our discussions above, we can make the following general observations on China’s 
implementation of the transparency obligation: 
First, the implementation at the Central Government level is better than the local 
government level; 
Second, among the Central Government ministries, MOFCOM has a better 
implementation record than the other ministries. Furthermore, those agencies with a primary or 
significant coverage of international trade-related issues such as General Administration of 
Customs and AQSIQ tend to have better transparency.  
Third, the implementation records of the local governments are uneven as well, with 
better records by the coastal provinces compared to the inland provinces. On some issues, some 
coastal cities such as Shenzhen have actually provided a model for the central government; 
Fourth, transparency has been greatly improved for formal laws and regulations, while 
many problems remain for informal rules; 
Fifth, the implementation of the transparency obligation mostly took place on an ad hoc 
basis, and currently there still is no institutional mechanism to address the transparency issue as a 
whole. 
 
1. Reasons  
 
In a way, China’s less-than-satisfactory implementation record of the transparency 
obligation is not really surprising, as it reflects deeper problems in the Chinese system. In 
particular, the reasons can be grouped into the following three categories. 
 
A. Political reasons 
 
The first is the de-centralized law making system, which is necessary because China is a 
vast country with differing conditions across many different regions. Moreover, as the reform 
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process is an unprecedented exercise with no pre-defined blueprint, the central government often 
encourages local governments to experiment with various initiatives. These criss-crossing 
network of legislative framework makes it difficult for the central government to comply with 
the transparency obligation, as even the central government itself might not always be aware of 
what’s going on at the local level. 
 
At the central government level, turf wars among the different ministries and agencies 
also made it hard to achieve full transparency. While MOFCOM claims that its requests for 
information from other agencies is justified by the need to comply with WTO obligations, the 
other agencies might regard such requests more as attempts by MOFCOM to grab power from 
them and thus are unwilling to give in. This is especially the case for the agencies which are 
higher than MOFCOM in the bureaucratic hierarchy, such as the NDRC and Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). For example, the first WTO case that China had to defend before the Panel and the AB - 
the China - Auto Parts case - concerns policies made by the NDRC and MOF.150 While other 
WTO Members have been raising questions about the policies since the first TRM,151 MOFCOM 
was unable to provide solutions as it did not have the power to overrule the decisions of the two 
agencies. This also illustrates the limitations of the transparency obligations.   
 
B. Practical reasons 
 
In addition to the political reasons, China also has practical difficulties in complying with 
the transparency obligations.  
 
First, many government officials lack familiarity with WTO obligations and might not be 
aware of the need to comply with such obligations. This is especially the case at the local 
government level. When it first acceded to the WTO, China launched extensive campaigns to 
educate the officials with WTO rules. As time went by, however, many officials have either 
moved on or simply forgotten the WTO rules as they are rarely used in everyday work.152 Even 
at the central government level, the officials in the non-trade related agencies are often not aware 
of the trade implications of their proposed regulations. The combination of these two factors 
makes it a major challenge to comply with the transparency obligation. 
 
On the other hand, while the officials in the trade-related ministries such as MOFCOM 
have higher levels of sensitivities of WTO obligations, they are often too busy to focus on the 
transparency obligations. For them, the more important work is often to ensure the consistency 
with the substantive obligations of the WTO. Thus, the implementation of procedural obligations 
such as transparency is often pushed to bottom of the to-do list. Moreover, as obligations such as 
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translations and TRM only benefit foreigners, they are often side-lined by the officials who have 
to give priorities to serving their domestic constituencies.     
 
C. Cultural reason 
 
Lastly, in the Chinese culture, there is a long-standing aversion to transparency of the 
law. For example, in 513 BC, the publication of the Penal Code by the Kingdom of Jin met with 
heavy criticisms from Confucius, who argued that the publication will disrupt the established 
social order and make it more difficult to govern the people as they can now rely on the law 
instead.153 Even today, this idea remains popular among Chinese officials. A lot of seemingly 
harmless information are still regarded as classified and state secret laws are widely used to 
persecute people who demand more transparency. Thus, it is unsurprising that transparency is 
regarded as an inconvenient obligation that is only reluctantly implemented.  
 
2. Conclusion  
 
This paper presents an interesting case study on how to enhance the transparency of a 
domestic legal regime through international agreements. As we can see from the foregoing 
discussions, external pressure can help to improve the transparency of the trade law to a certain 
extent, mainly through the imposition of certain guidelines and establishment of relevant 
institutions. The successful experiences in the trade law system can also provide a model for 
other areas of law. However, in the long term, it is difficult to achieve full transparency without 
systemic reform in the domestic legal system as a whole. As noted by William Alford, 
“A system of state determination of which ideas may or may not be disseminated is 
fundamentally incompatible with one of strong intellectual property rights in which individuals 
have the authority to determine how expressions of their ideas may be used and ready access to 
private legal remedies to vindicate such rights.”154 
 
To paraphrase Alford, a system of state determination of which information may or may 
not be published is fundamentally incompatible with one of strong transparency rights in which 
individuals have the authority to determine how their right to information may be exercised and 
ready access to private legal remedies to vindicate such rights. 
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